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There is a growing focus in political science on right-wing populist parties. But few 
comparative studies address their discourses and politics relating to family values, 
especially when involved with policy-making. Moreover, many comparative works 
about populism focus on a single region – often Western and Eastern Europe. This paper 
adopts a definition of populism with two different dimensions: the vertical (inclusive), 
which regards elites, and the horizontal (exclusive), which addresses ‘foreigners’. The 
use of family values in political discourse and policy pertains to the two axes of 
populism. On the one hand are elites who are accused of being uncommitted to 
traditional values and morally corrupt. On the other hand are demographic concerns 
regarding declining birth rates among native populations and immigrants with large 
families. The stress on family values can also originate from a value orientation – or 
merely a tactical move – engendered by political competition. This paper specifically 
examines the politics of family values in the context of policies concerning gender 
equality, family planning and LGBT rights in three countries: Israel, Italy and Turkey. 
These countries share a rather strong religious tradition, experienced changes in family 
orientations and have populist political parties that appeal to religious values. In our 
comparative study, we explore these developments and the role of family values in the 
discourses and policies of the Likud and Shas parties in Israel, the Lega and Fratelli 
















Right-wing populist parties (RPP) have become prominent political actors across the 
world but relatively few comparative studies address their discourses and policies relating to 
family values and gender equality. Only lately, as Alessia Dona (2020) states, research has 
focused on the role gender plays in RPP’s discourse and policies. RPP are associated with 
conservative values and affinity with religion. Accordingly, it is expected that they would 
oppose policies that favor LGBT+ rights and gender equality and support more traditional 
family values. Nevertheless, as we explore in this comparative study of RPPs in Italy, Israel 
and Turkey, these parties can display different and at times somewhat liberal attitudes 
towards these issues. These different attitudes, we argue in this paper, first, reflect particular 
relationships the parties maintain with religion. And, second, the “horizontal” distinction they 
wish to maintain between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (namely ‘foreigners’ or ‘threatening others’) can 
lead to a less conservative approach functional for strengthening this distinction. 
While many comparative works about populism focus on a single region – often 
Western and Eastern Europe – a study of the Mediterranean can offer a different perspective. 
We adopt a definition of populism as related to two different axes: vertical, addressing 
“people” and elites, and horizontal, positing “people” against ‘foreigners’. The use of family 
values in political discourse and policy pertains to both axes, with elites accused of being 
uncommitted to traditional values and morally corrupt, and demographic concerns regarding 
declining birth rates among native populations and immigrants with large families. In this 
paper, the politics of family values are studied through policies concerning gender equality, 
family planning and LGBT+ rights in three countries: Israel, Italy and Turkey. These 
countries share a rather strong religious tradition, but also experienced de-facto changes in 
family orientations and have populist political parties that appeal to religious values. In our 
comparative study, we explore these developments and the role of family values in the 
discourses and policies of the Likud and Shas parties in Israel, the Lega and Fratelli d’Italia 
parties in Italy and the AKP (Justice and Development Party- Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in 
Turkey. 
In the first, theoretical, part of the paper, we explain the relation between RPPs, 
religion and family values, Then, in the second part, we describe our three case studies. 
Finally, we draw several insights from the comparison we make. 
 
Populism, Religion and Family 
Political scientists first identified the family of right-wing populist parties (RPP) in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when they emerged in European countries such as France, Italy and 
Austria (Ignazi 1994; Betz 1994). Since the 2000s, RPPs have become prominent not only in 
Europe as populist parties and leaders won elections in different countries, but also in other 
parts of the world such as the US, Brazil, and India (Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016; 
Albertazzi and Mcdonnell 2007; Minkenberg 2000; Brubaker 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; 
Mudde 2007, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). 
Populism has been defined as an ideology (Mudde 2007, Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017), a political strategy (Weyland 2001, Roberts 2006), a logic of politics 
(Laclau 2005), a mode of political practice (Jansen 2011) or a discursive style or frame 
(Jagers and Walgrave 2007, Moffitt and Tormey 2013, Aslanidis 2016). Although all these 
definitions can provide an explanation for the relationship between populism, religion and 
family values, we have chosen to adopt the ‘ideational’ definition of populism as most of the 
research on the topic (Abi Hassan 2017, de Lange and Mugge 2015, Spierings et al. 2015, 
Dietze and Roth 2020) do, namely:  
… a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” 
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté Générale 
(general will) of the people (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 6). 
Moreover, studies of populism differentiate between “inclusionary” and 
“exclusionary” populism. The former suggests a vertical axis where the “people” (the ‘plebs’) 
are positioned against “elites”. The latter, right wing populism,  suggests a nativist 
understanding of the people as an ethno-cultural closed group, separating them from 
foreigners or outsiders (Betz 2001, Mudde and Katlwasser 2013). Populism, consequently, is 
‘an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and 
dangerous “others” depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of 
their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice’ (Albertazzi and Mcdonnell 2007, 3). 
 To Define the people  negative contents - anti-elite or anti-foreigner – may not be 
enough.  Accordingly, ‘populist politics also needs a convincing moral claim to trigger the 
self-righteous indignation necessary to construct, define and mobilise the authentic “good” 
people against the alien other’ (Cohen and Arato, 2012: 102). Moreover, boundaries must be 
defined and maintained, because populism – particularly exclusionary right wing populism – 
contains a strong friend/enemy logic, with elements of nativism and suspicion towards 
foreign ideas and people (Mudde, 2004: 16). In this context, religion can perform an 
important role in populist ideology and strategy by providing positive contents to the signifier 
“people”, and a moral justification for it; and by delineating the boundaries of exclusion and 
inclusion. As Arato and Cohen illustrated, 
Religious identity politics provide unifying content for the chain of equivalents in 
populist logic, helps moralize the friend and demonize the enemy, and to frame the 
elites and ‘others’ as immoral and corrupt, and thus part of a deeper threat to ‘our’ 
tradition that must be warded off, while providing a needed moral aura for populist 
politics (2012: 108). 
The role that religion plays for RPPs, providing content and justification, explain the latter’s 
association with religiosity, social conservatism and, consequently, support for ‘traditional’ 
family values. Accordingly, they are expected to oppose policies that promote gender 
equality and LGBT+ rights. But in many cases – mainly in the context of an anti-foreigners, 
and often anti-Islamic posture – RPPs adopt an identitarian ‘Christianism’, “a secularist 
posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights 
and freedom of speech” that excludes non-European immigrants depicted as non-liberal and 
therefore foreign to European culture of tolerance (Brubaker, 2017.: 1193)[2]. 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) argue that populist parties’ attitudes regarding 
gender issues are unrelated to the core definition of populism. Comparing Latin American 
populism (Chavism and the Bolivian MAS) with Northern European RPPs they claim 
attitudes towards gender reflected the cultural milieu of each country (Latin American 
machismo vs more gender equal attitudes in Northern Europe) and the different parties’ 
position on the left/right axis (left populists have more egalitarian stance than right wing 
populists). This view is shared Abi Hassan (2017) and Spierling (2020), who argues that 
gender does not belong to the core of radical right populism, but is “instrumentalized to … 
emphasize [its] ideology” (Spierling 2020:42). Below, we offer a different explanation 
demonstrated through our case studies. 
Conceptual approach and methodology: 
Our conceptual approach is based on three main complementary arguments. First, 
against Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, we argue that right wing populist parties’ approaches 
to family values and gender issues relate to the core definition of right wing populism. RPPs 
perceive the “people” as a big biological family, and the family as a gendered biological 
unity. This is not the case for other conservative parties, for which the people as a collective 
subject plays a lesser role; nor for left populist parties, who conceive the people inclusively. 
The right wing populist conception of the family includes a gender hierarchy (Collins 1998), 
and the traditional family is perceived as intrinsic to the definition of the people. Second, 
though the family is central to their conceptualization of the people, RPPs may adopt 
different attitudes and policy preferences towards  gender- and family-related issues. This 
variance does not depend on their cultural milieu approach (pace Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser’s claim) but on two other variables. The first one, the particular relationships the 
parties maintain with religion, which determine their perceptions of family values and gender 
issues.  The second one, whether a less conservative approach to family values and gender 
issues is functional to maintaining the horizontal distinction between “us” and “them”, that is  
the main political issue for right wing populist parties.  
Methodologically, the paper develops these two arguments through a comparative 
study of right-wing exclusionary populist parties in Israel, Italy and Turkey. In terms of the 
historical role of religion and the role of populist parties as key players in government, those 
are most-similar cases; while they differ in the religious traditions involved (Judaism in 
Israel, Christianity in Italy, and Islam in Turkey), and in patterns of relations and 
arrangements between religion and politics, with religion retaining different levels of 
authority and influence. The paper compares the following populist parties in the three 
countries: the Likud and Shas parties in Israel, the Lega and Fratelli d’Italia parties in Italy 
and the AKP in Turkey.  
In the three cases below, we examine how the RPPs conceptualise their particular 
relations to religion and their approaches to issues of family and gender. Due to the limited 
scope of this paper we can only offer a conceptual idea through a glimpse of the different 
parties’ positions, reflected in public debates and statements. As to the relation to religion, we 
consider the public significance of religious institutions – the Catholic Church, the Islamic 
Diyanet and the Rabbinical authority – and religious constituencies’ impact on  the parties’ 
policies and platforms. We focus on two sets of policies where religious demands impact 
society at large, including non-religious, both related to “family values”, which in all the 
cases we dealt with are crucial to define the boundaries between religion and state, and to 
give shape to debates between liberal and conservative values. Therefore, we examine, first, 
how the parties address issues of abortion and marriage, and second, their approaches to 
gender equality and LGBT+ rights. We analyse the parties’ statements, platforms and policies 
to demonstrate similarities and differences and the circumstances under which they adopt 
conservative or relatively liberal attitudes.  
 Israel 
Israel is considered the most family-oriented among post-industrial societies, having a 
high marriage rate, low divorce rate and high fertility rate (Fogel-Bijaoui, 2005). As elsewhere, 
religiosity strongly influences conservative attitudes towards family values, translating into 
opposition to abortion or same-sex marriage and a reluctance to support gender equality. 
Religion is integral to Israeli politics and social life, defining the boundaries of Jewish 
nationalism and impacting issues of citizenship and rights. The religious biological definition 
of a Jewish people – born to a Jewish mother – deeply influences the legal definition of 
citizenship. Debates over the status of halakhah (Jewish religious law) in the conduct of public 
and private life occupied the Zionist movement from its inception and produced a slew of 
compromises. The agreement that came to be known as ‘status quo’ was established prior to – 
but was developed after – statehood in 1948 between the dominant and secular Labor party and 
the religious parties, guiding the role of religion in public life and including religious authority 
and monopoly over burial, marriage and divorce. Consensus around the status quo was depicted 
as essential for nation-building and allowed the Labor Party to dominate foreign policy and 
security in return for the religious Orthodox monopoly over significant aspects of public life, 
often at the expense of gender equality. 
 
While religion remains a strong force in the Israeli society and has formally conceded 
little if any of its authority, it politicised religious-secular controversies, and undermined the 
consensus around the status quo. On the one hand, non-religious and liberal Israelis 
increasingly demand religious freedom and the end of the Orthodox monopoly. On the other 
hand, religious entities want to maintain what is described as the ‘Jewish character of the state’. 
Liberal struggles for religious freedom in the 1990s were the consequence of two main nascent 
forces: the emerging market economy (Carmeli and Applebaum, 2006; Ram, 2008) and the 
mass immigration from the former Soviet Union of mostly secular Jews. Though these 
processes failed to alter formal laws and procedures, they did impact everyday issues such as 
sexuality and family life (Ben-Porat, 2013). 
The religious public in Israel perceives the Orthodox monopoly on marriage as essential 
to maintain the unity of the people and prevent intermarriage. But the conservative nature of 
Israel’s institutions on gender and family issues is matched by growing de-facto liberalisation. 
Secular Israelis who are increasingly discontent with the Orthodox monopoly found ways to 
evade restrictions, holding wedding ceremonies that matched their identity as secular Jews and 
their commitment to gender equality (Ben-Porat, 2013; Prashizky, 2011), married abroad or 
chose cohabitation (Glickman et al. 2003). This process of the de-institutionalisation of 
marriage also included demands for the state to recognise a growing number of alternative 
families and same-sex couples. Until the 1980s, homosexuality generally existed on the 
margins of society and was kept secret. But the struggle for equal rights intensified after the 
successful campaign to annul the law banning homosexual intercourse in 1988, emphasising 
the desire to integrate the LGBT+ community into Israeli society (Kama, 2000). The LGBT+ 
community entered the public dialogue via politics, courts of law, cultural creativity and the 
media. Same-sex relationships became increasingly legitimate, especially among the secular 
public, and annual gay pride parades began to be held even in more conservative cities such as 
Jerusalem. Norms changed and legal limitations were bypassed outside formal political 
institutions. But the next step – deemed essential to facilitate equal rights – was the struggle 
for the formal recognition of same-sex marriages and family units. Issues related to religious 
authority, gender equality and family values remain pertinent and incredibly politicised and 
relate to national unity and strength, forcing populist parties to take a stance. 
Populism as a political phenomenon is central to Israeli politics, with two parties – 
Likud and Shas – that have been a part of most governing coalitions for the past three decades. 
Likud, previously called Herut, became a populist inclusive movement under Menachem 
Begin’s leadership (Filc 2010). The party developed a narrative of Israeli history that 
symbolically incorporated Mizrahim – Jews who immigrated from Arab countries – into the 
common ‘we’. Incorporation was both material, through economic and social policies, and 
political, opening the party to a young Mizrahi leadership. The Likud is not a religious party 
but has a large traditional and even religious constituency and supports the status-quo. Since 
the mid-2000s, Likud has transformed into a populist exclusionary party, embracing nativism 
and, according to the religious definition of who is a Jew, emphasising a closed ethnonational 
unity based on ‘common blood’.  
Both Begin and Netanyahu, Likud’s most salient populist leaders, conceived the 
[Jewish] people as a brotherhood. In one of his most famous discourses, Begin differentiated 
the Labor party’s exclusion of Mizrahim from the Likud’s approach, claiming “We are all 
brothers, all of us Jewish, all of us equal.” More recently, Netanyahu depicted this brotherhood 
as differentiating Jewish Israelis from Arabs and Palestinians: “[W]e must always remember a 
single, simple truth. We are brothers, we are one people, there is no other” (Netanyahu 2019). 
The people as brotherhood grounds an exclusive populism directed against the ‘others’. As a 
result, the ‘people’ are described as constantly threatened by foreign enemies, Palestinian 
citizens or asylum seekers. Accompanying this is anti-elitism directed against the cultural and 
judicial elites, who are depicted as disloyal and favouring civil and human rights at the expense 
of national interests. 
 
Shas emerged in 1983 as a reaction to the exclusion and segregation of the Mizrahim in 
the closed ultra-orthodox world and overall marginalization. The party’s constituency 
comprises an ultra-orthodox core and a traditionalist periphery, the bulk of its voters are lower-
class Mizrahim (Peled, 1998). Shas addresses society as divided into the Jewish people (‘we 
the people’), understood as a religious community, with Mizrahim as its core (the ‘true’ 
people). Like the Likud, Shas understands the people as a brotherhood, as its leader Arieh Deri 
tweeted after the September 2019 elections: “In this month of repentance and compassion, we 
must put hate behind us and remember that we [the Israeli Jews] are all brothers” Shas 
combines claims for Mizrahim’s inclusion with support for exclusionary policies towards 
migrant workers and asylum seekers, though its approach to Arab citizens is more nuanced 
than that of Likud. As a religious party, it supports the primacy of Jewish religion, and its vision 
of democracy is profoundly anti-liberal. The party, representing the poor classes, also supports 
welfare policies and redistribution, another facet distinct from Likud’s neo-liberal agenda. 
Likud’s exclusionary populism, directed against Arab citizens, asylum seekers and 
‘elites’, accompanied a relatively liberal stance towards questions of family values and gender 
equality. The party adopted the status quo regarding marriage, opposing attempts to change the 
formal rules of marriage, but did little to prevent the growth of marriage outside the rabbinate, 
cohabitation and the de facto legalisation of alternative families. Similarly, Likud does not 
oppose abortion but did not join liberal demands to ease restrictions and make abortion 
completely voluntary. Its stance towards the LGBT+ community has largely been liberal: the 
party has an active LGBT+ forum, and one of its members, Amir Ohana, is a senior party 
member, former minister of justice and current minister of internal security and is openly gay. 
Likud formally supports gender equality and representation, but, like most other Israeli parties, 
women are a minority among party MKs and leadership. The party adopts ‘feminist’ policies 
in its active support for Arab women to enter the labor market such that ‘feminism’ becomes a 
way of stressing the differences between the (Jewish) people and the others, somewhat similar 
to what Brubaker (2018) describes for RPP’s in Europe. Overall, Likud’s moderate and liberal 
positions can be explained, first, because most its voters are not Orthodox religious, and, 
second, because these positions reinforce its populist-exclusionary approach to citizenship 
because they allow to present Muslims as “non-modern” and “non-tolerant.” 
For Shas, unlike Likud, family values are central. A 2006 survey demonstrated that 
Shas was far more committed to traditionalist values than Likud. This included its opposition 
to changing marriage legislation and to any recognition of LGBT+ families or extensions of 
LGBT+ rights (Shaham-Katzir 2006). Its leaders have been vocal against the LGBT+ 
community. For instance, when the Tel Aviv municipality included a gay couple in an 
advertisement, a Shas party member demanded its removal: ‘The municipality should 
strengthen family values rather than obscene massages’ (Morag, 2013). They claimed that 
‘homosexuals poison society’ and that legislation allowing gay couples to adopt children leads 
to ‘Sodom and Gomorrah’ (Wolff, 2008). A party member of Parliament was forced to resign 
after attending the wedding reception of his gay nephew. Party membership is restricted to 
men, since the party believes women should be kept away from public exposure, in general, 
and politics, in particular. Consequently, there are no women MKs, although the party 
organised women’s meetings in the last elections to encourage women to vote. Shas opposes 
abortion, though it does not actively promote anti-abortion legislation. 
In sum, both parties support the legal status quo, but Likud accepts informal 
liberalisation, and family values are not central to its agenda. Shas, conversely, views family 
values as paramount, and it actively supports the heteropatriarchy. Likud’s ‘exclusive 
populism’, mostly wields religion instrumentally as a marker of a threat – Muslim enemies and 
their ‘allies’ among the liberal-secular left. For Shas, religion functions principally as the 
content of party identity and the foundation of Jewish-Mizrahi inclusion. 
Italy 
Although Italy is officially a secular state and Italian society has undergone significant 
secularisation processes in recent decades, Catholicism maintains a privileged role in the 
country in terms of societal and political influence (Garelli 2006; Diotallevi 2002). This 
influence is further enhanced by the morality politics mode of the Italian debate (Knill and 
Preidel 2015) and the Vatican’s influence on centre-right and centre-left political actors 
(Ozzano 2015). This situation traditionally favoured conservative views on family- and gender-
related issues, which were partly shared, at least until the 1970s, also by many leftists and 
secular people. Particularly – while the views on gender roles largely changed between the 
1970s and the 1980s, for example with the legalizations of abortion and divorce – it determined 
a broad consensus on the exclusion of LGBT+ rights from the field of legitimate issues of 
public discussion in Italy, and the tolerance of homosexual behaviours only insofar they 
remained purely private and hidden from public view. In the 2000s, and particularly the 2010s, 
this situation started to change, with an increasing public visibility of the LGBT+ community, 
and a growing number of Italians favourable to the public recognition of same-sex unions (with 
a slight majority in 2016, when the Italian parliament approved their legalization, which 
became almost 60%, according to surveys, in 2020). 
 
In this latter phase - with the Catholic Church increasingly focused on other social and 
economic issues under the leadership of Pope Francis - in the public discussion conservative 
positions on family issues and LGBT+ rights were largely shaped by two right-wing populist 
parties: the Lega (League) and Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI), which collectively won 
21.7 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections and 40.7 per cent in the 2019 
elections for the European Parliament. 
The Lega, formerly Lega Nord (Northern League, LN), was created in 1989 with the 
coalescence of several northern Italian regionalist parties. Until the early 2000s, the party 
mostly focused on the centre-periphery cleavage, demanding autonomy – or even 
independence – for the northern Italian regions, and displayed an ambiguous attitude towards 
religion, with an oscillation between Christian ultra-conservative positions, and the use of neo-
pagan symbols and rituals (Guolo 2011). The party’s base, however, was markedly 
conservative and patriarchal, which involved conservative views on the family and gender roles 
and a restrictive idea of citizenship. Since the 2000s, the party has openly stressed a 
conservative Catholic identity, honing in on morality politics and religion-related issues, 
especially in opposition to religious pluralism and multiculturalism (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016; 
Ozzano 2016). This process culminated in 2013 with the leadership of Matteo Salvini, who 
successfully transformed the party into a full-fledged right-wing nationalist party, competing 
in all Italian regions and highlighting immigration as its main issue. This transformation of the 
party also implied the abandonment of neo-Pagan symbology, with a conservative view of 
Catholicism mainly indicative of a Western and Italian identity in opposition to Islam. In the 
late 2010s, this attitude culminated with Salvini’s more explicit use of Christian symbols, 
particularly the crucifix, the Gospel and references to the ‘Heart of Mary’, during speeches at 
electoral rallies and even in parliamentary debates, a choice the Vatican itself criticised. In turn, 
the party did not refrain to harshly criticize the Church for its attitude towards immigration, 
Islam, and multiculturalism, regarded by the Lega as too soft (Passarelli and Tuorto 2018; 
Ozzano 2019 and 2020b; Molle 2019). 
FdI, unlike the Lega, is the heir to an extensive tradition of right-wing politics, which 
stems from the neo-fascist MSI. The party is rooted in a cultural tradition focused on an idea 
of citizenship conceived in ethnocultural – if not explicitly racist – terms, with a conception of 
the homeland and the Italian people as a wide family. In the early 1990s, the party carried out 
a process of internal revision and moderation and renamed itself Alleanza Nazionale (National 
Alliance, AN) before joining the Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom, PdL) under Silvio 
Berlusconi’s leadership (Ignazi 2018). In 2012, however, most former AN representatives 
decided to leave the PdL to form the FdI under the leadership of a woman: Giorgia Meloni. 
The supporters of the party, initially around 5 per cent, grew significantly in the late 2010s to 
well over 10 per cent.[4] In relation to religion, the party - although sharing with the Lega both 
the conservative platform and the conservative voting base - looked more restrained than this 
latter, both in terms of display of religious symbols and criticism towards the Church. 
The positions of both parties towards family and gender-related issues are today marked 
by a conservative and identity-driven Catholic orientation, which aligns with the party’s base 
that has always been quite morally traditionalist. Studies of the Lega carried out in the 2000s 
reported that Padania – the imagined northern Italian homeland that Lega militants sought to 
create – was conceived as ‘a masculine nation’ because of the idea of division of labour 
between genders, the machist attitude of the main LN leaders and an emphasis on toughness 
and courage in political activity (Scrinzi 2013, 5; Avanza 2008). However, the party frequently 
exploited the issue of women’s rights and gender equality in relation to Islam and 
multiculturalism, especially in the 2000s and 2010s, when the party representatives sought to 
stigmatise the alleged superiority of Western culture in terms of civil rights and portray Islam 
as a threat to women’s rights and integrity (Scrinzi 2012; Ozzano and Giorgi 2016). 
These seemingly liberal cultural attitudes, however, were largely limited to the anti-
Islamic rhetoric, and often complemented a conspiratorial attitude, merging anti-leftist, 
Eurosceptic, anti-LGBT+ rights and pro-‘traditional family’ positions. In the 2000s, the LN 
was crucial for the passage of law 40/2004, which strongly limited medically assisted 
procreation and stem cell research, and campaigned for the subsequent referendum, opposing 
its abrogation (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016). Party representatives were particularly outspoken on 
issues of LGBT+ rights, voicing their opposition to legalisation and deliberately employing 
politically incorrect language (Ozzano 2015; 2016) with homosexuals labelled as ‘capons’, 
‘culattoni’ and ‘finocchi’ (Italian slurs).[5] For example, when Spain legalised same-sex 
marriage, the party dubbed La Padania “La favola di finocchio” (the fable of faggot).[6] The 
religious background of these statements was often implicit but was sometimes expressed 
openly. Minister for Reforms Roberto Calderoli, for instance, declared that the legalisation of 
same-sex unions ‘makes me laugh. The good God made us with different qualities: man and 
woman.’[7] 
The approach of the party to family and gender issues became more ambivalent in the 
2010s. Its representatives – although not substantially changing their positions on these issues 
– mostly refrained from adopting the politically incorrect language their discourses were 
fraught with in the 2000s (Ozzano 2020a). Moreover, when the party formed a coalition 
government with the Movimento Cinquestelle (Five Star Movement – M5S) in 2018, Salvini 
proclaimed that issues, such as revising laws on abortion and same-sex unions, were not a part 
of the government program. 
Conversely, the Lega managed to create a new Ministry of the Family and Disability, 
to which a member of his cadre, Lorenzo Fontana, was assigned. Fontana was known for being 
an ultra-conservative Catholic and a hardliner on issues of morality, as he made clear in 
interviews following his appointment.[8] In its defence of the traditional family, and in its 
engagement in the so-called anti-gender movement (Garbagnoli 2017; Prearo 2017), the party 
– now rebranded simply as Lega – also aligned and maintained frequent contacts with not only 
other European right-wing populist leaders but also international religious organisations and 
conservative groups from elsewhere in the world – particularly the US and Russia (which, 
although not directly engaged in politics, proposed platforms quite similar to right-wing 
populist parties). This became very clear in March 2019, when the World Congress of Families 
conference, a US Christian pro-life organisation with good ties with the former Soviet states, 
was held in Verona, Fontana’s hometown and a hotbed of right-wing Catholicism.[9] Three 
Ministers of the Lega – Fontana, Salvini and Bussetti, the education minister – officially 
participated in the event, declaring their opposition to LGBT+ rights and criticising feminists, 
who, in Salvini’s words, are unaware that the real danger their rights pose is ‘Islamic 
extremism, a culture where the woman's value is less than zero’ (Fox and Di Donato 2019). 
One of the event’s organisers, the Lega Senator Simone Pillon, also submitted a contentious 
draft bill, which provoked harsh controversy among leftist groups and feminist and proposed a 
revision to the Italian family law, particularly for the regulations on the custody of minors 
(Lavizzari 2019). 
FdI’s positions have not been subjected to extensive academic analysis, both because 
the party’s electoral support was, until 2019, quite limited, and because its positions are rather 
similar to Lega’s platform (Ignazi 2018). This is particularly true for issues of religion and 
morality politics, with the party opposing multiculturalism, the immigration of Muslims and 
the construction of mosques (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016) and sometimes waving the flag of 
religious freedom to push an anti-Islamic perspective, as its members did in April 2019 after 
the bloody jihadist attacks in Sri Lanka. This position also relates to a support for Chauvinist 
welfare measures, in line with the traditional ‘social’ orientation of the Italian post-Fascist and 
neo-Fascist far right. The party supports the idea of the ‘traditional family’, although its 
opponents have criticised Giorgia Meloni, as they did with Salvini, because this position 
apparently contradicts the choices in her private life. With gender issues, the party, like the 
Lega, has joined in the 2010s the chorus of conservative Catholic and right-wing groups 
denouncing an alleged gender conspiracy, and Meloni also participated in the World Congress 
of Families in Verona (Garbagnoli 2017; Pavan 2019). Constituting one small distinction 
between the two parties, perhaps, is Meloni’s image of being a publicly engaged woman, 
similar to France’s Marine Le Pen, emphasising the inclusion of women in the workforce and 
messages explicitly addressed to women (Nadeau 2018) which have appeared less frequently 
in Lega’s communications. On the other hand, Meloni, unlike other Italian female centre-right 
politicians, has consistently supported a resolutely pro-life platform by, for example, endorsing 
a pro-life motion approved by the City Council of Verona and supporting the pro-life 
association ProVita, which had affixed an anti-abortion poster depicting a fetus in Rome.[10] 
As a whole, both parties propose an exclusionary version of populism and a 
traditionalist agenda in relation to gender and morality issues, although both of them are 
increasingly ambivalent in their rhetoric (often in anti-Islamic perspective) and have adopted 
in the 2010s a more politically correct language. In the case of the Lega, the conservative 
platform is more explicitly framed in religious terms, with the uninhibited use of Christian 
symbols at political rallies and, apparently, the attempt to compete with the Vatican to define 
the meaning of Christianity in the public sphere. 
Turkey 
In modern Turkey, religion has always occupied a unique and salient role in both state 
and society, lying somewhere between the mutually dependent points of continuity and 
disengagement, and the boundaries of legitimacy these designated (Ozturk 2021, Kuru 2009). 
Although the state has been defined as constitutionally secular, religion remained significant, 
though in different institutions and communities which have direct or indirect relations with 
the state (Ozturk 2019). This sui generis state-religion relations and the constitutional 
secularism had significant implications for women (White 2003), who earned the right to vote 
and be elected to office much earlier than in many Western nations. A series of laws passed 
since 1930 allowed women to participate in municipal elections and later to be muhtars 
(leaders) in villages and to be elected to village councils of elders (Arat 1989, 29). They gained 
the rights to vote for and be elected parliamentary deputies with legislative changes made in 
the Constitution and in the Elections Law on 5 December 1934 (Arat 2000). Yet gender equality 
was limited and instrumental in Turkey’s Islamist political parties (Kadioglu 1994, 645), 
communities and institutions, all of which operated within a patriarchal order (Kandiyoti 1991). 
The Diyanet, for example, can nominate women employees and offers separate services to 
women with religious personnel called vaize (Maritato 2015), but its overall attitude remains 
conservative via employing patriarchal language. Even though, during the progressibe years 
the AKP committed not to follow classical Islamist road, as of 2021, the party has been using 
overdoes Islam almost in every political move, including gender equality, family planning and 
LGBT+ rights. 
The AKP’s rise to power included an implicit populist horizontal distinction of us/them 
between secular city-dwellers (the so-called white Turks) and the more religious Turkish 
citizens of the province (Yilmaz 2017). The party, through religious groups and communities, 
mobilized support that enabled it to become the ruling party. Under AKP rule, religion and 
religious communities became ever more important, part and parcel of the party’s populism. 
Religious oriented policies received support from significant constituencies (Kaya 2015), but 
sharpened divisions within society. In this regard, some have argued that the AKP’s populism 
has been nourished by Islamic discourse (Yabanci 2020), and the AKP’s populism can be 
defined as both inclusive, against secular elites, and exclusive, instrumentalising ethno-
religious based nationalism against the West and non-Muslims (Yabanci 2018; Yalvac and 
Joseph 2019). These ideas were not directly present in the early years of the AKP’s rise to 
power, but over time, the party adopted an explicit nativist (mainly anti-Kurd and anti-Alevi) 
and authoritarian stance, with direct bearing on family and gender issues (Cosar and Yegenoglu 
2011), and a unique version of religious populism.  
Positioning itself as a ‘catch-all party’ (Çınar 2016) enabled the AKP to receive support 
from wide cycles. Its inclusive populism was directed against the bureaucratic establishment 
(Gursoy 2019) and the Kemalist elites. This allowed it to garner sympathy from liberal and 
leftist groups, who sought to be rescued from military and bureaucratic tutelage, the lower-
middle class, which supported market economics in expectation of upward mobilisation, and 
moderately religious citizens. Accordingly, the AKP collaborated with various segments of 
society and earned support while doing so. Apart from a few exceptions, which associated 
themselves with classical centre-right parties, nearly all Islamic community organisations 
ultimately became supporters of the AKP, including the controversial Gülen Movement. 
Indeed, this kind of division should be seen as the beginning of polarisation and criminalisation 
of the opponents even in the Party’s progressive years.  
After the first decade of 2000’s, global and regional developments – particularly the 
Arab spring – declining economic growth, internal instability and the Gezi Park demonstrations 
in 2013, and the conflict with the Gülen Movement - triggered changes (Watmough and Ozturk 
2018). Changes made AKP’s populism more inclusive, drawing support from the masses, and 
exclusive, further emphasising the role of nationalism. The AKP’s authoritarian drift created a 
party structure loyal to its leader from bottom up and under his control (Yabanci 2020). Under 
this growing authoritarianism that AKP also withdrew from the relatively liberal stance of its 
early period. Party’s rhetoric and policies were directed against civil society organisations, 
including those working to promote gender equality (Gunes-Ayata and Dogangun 2017). This 
change can be described as the party’s return to its Islamic foundations, a male-dominated 
understanding of politics and an exclusive populist discourse against non-Sunni Muslims. The 
shift to authoritarianism under the AKP – and the unification of this authoritarianism with Islam 
– meant that religion was used to draw moral boundaries, with family values and gender issues 
defining a moral community (Mutluer 2019). In this community, being a member of an Islamic 
organisation is a dominant component of the definition of a big family in the mindset of the 
AKP regime, partitioning ‘us’ from ‘them’ along the fault lines of gender and family issues. 
Here, as in the previous two cases, nation and family became intertwined. 
After taking power, Erdoğan emphasised that LGBT+ rights, women equality and 
freedoms would be legally guaranteed, but his stance and the party’s, became gradually more 
authoritarian and conservative, illustrated by the actions and statements of AKP administrators 
and parliamentary members. The party’s MPs, for example, objected to the inclusion of 
LGBT+ citizens and rejected the proposal to create a ‘Branch Directorate for Social Gender 
Equality’ in the opposition-held Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. During the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipal Assembly’s second session, in March 2020, AKP member of 
parliament Kaynar stated that ‘social gender’ addressed an ‘intermediary gender’ rather than 
men and women. Unwilling to say ‘LGBT+’, he instead just mentioned ‘those letters’: 
 
Social gender equality is not a concept relating to women. They are trying to deceive 
the public by concealing something here. The creation of this directorate is the defence 
of those letter. There have been a few attempts by the LGBTs in Istanbul that have 
failed. They want to enact a slew of things, wrapping themselves in the colours of the 
rainbow. They are now trying to enact this with the municipality, and we oppose this 
politically, culturally and religiously.[11] 
 
In earlier years, when EU accession was still discussed, the AKP was ambivalent about 
questions such as the criminalisation of adultery and extra-marital sex (zina in Islamic law) and 
the legalisation of abortion. Under the new populist stance, however, its position crystallised 
and became more conservative. Erdoğan, who at every opportunity during his tenure as prime 
minister articulated his opposition to caesarean births and abortion, encouraged Turkish 
families to have three children for the sake of cultivating future religious generations in order 
to protect the country’s legacy. Furthermore, femicide experienced a drastic spike in Turkey 
during AKP rule, which was marred with masculine politics. The recommendations of the 
family and religious guidance bureaus, part of the Diyanet, to combat violence against women 
were very conservative and misguided. They suggested that women who suffer violence from 
men examine their own behaviours, attempt to resolve the dispute within the family and appeal 
to authorities only as a last resort. Contradicting the spirit of the Istanbul Convention, which 
aims to eliminate gender-based violence and to which Turkey is a party, Turkey and the Diyanet 
have adopted a more conservative approach. The messages the Diyanet has released for women 
feature concepts such as ‘emanet’, ‘itaat’ and ‘fıtrat’ (security, obedience and motherhood), 
while equality was notably absent. 
Traditional gender roles were portrayed as moral and essential for the strength of the 
nation. On International Women’s Day in 2016, Erdogan said he believes that ‘a woman is 
above all a mother’ and urged the audience to protect family rights as Islam commands. He 
underlined that one cannot free women by destroying the notion of family, drawing on 
references from Quran.[12] Similarly, he argued that Muslim families should forgo birth 
control and that abortion is a crime against humanity that is polarising Turkish society.[13] 
Finally, Erdogan openly declared, in 2014, that equality between men and women violates 
nature: ‘You cannot make a mother, who must breastfeed her child, equal to a man. You cannot 
make women do everything men do, as the communist regimes did … this is against her 
delicate nature.’[14] 
The AKP regime, by combining moral, religious and family values, severed the 
‘virtuous-Muslim’ (us) from the ‘immoral-deviant’ (others). Its religious and anti-elitist 
discourse targeted the Kemalist secular elite – founders of modern Turkey – positing devout 
Anatolians as the ‘people’, pious and loyal. In late 2018, for example, Erdogan labelled the 
Kemalists “parasites”: ‘Elites who leech off of the country, eat the creams of this country, they 
are the main reason for cultural loss.’[15] He also blamed the Turkish secular elite for the 
marginalisation of the devoted masses’ moral values, and condemned attempts to secularise 
them. He frequently stressed that the Turkish people must uphold their moral values and 
maintain their lifestyles according to the principles of Islam.[16] On January 1, Erdogan 
appointed a controversial new rector for Bogazici University, one of Turkey’s prestigious 
universities. Students and academic staff protested the nomination, described as “political.” 
Police arrested five students during the protest after an art exhibition included an LGBT flag 
alongside the Kaaba, a sacred Muslim site. Erdogan accused LGBT+ activists of undermining 
‘our national and spiritual values’ and ‘poisoning’ young people. [17]  
Overall, the AKP has shifted from its inclusive and relatively liberal stance into a right-
wing populist party, attached to its religious core. Religiosity was inseparable from AKPs 
populism, leaving little room for liberalism. Consequently, family values and tradition, 
according to the AKP, separated the “people” from elites, polarizing Turkish society.   
Concluding Remarks 
Studies of populism adopt different points of view about whether family and gender-
related issues are at the core of populist ideology, and which factors explain populist parties 
and leaders’ stances on those issues. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s claim that family and 
gender issues are not central to populist conceptions and that the dominant conceptions about 
these issues in specific countries determine the attitudes of populists. In this paper, we offer a 
different explanation. Drawing on the case studies presented above we argue that family and 
gender issues are central to exclusionary populism because “the people” are conceived as a 
broad family. Moreover, we argue that it is not the ‘national culture’ but the role played by 
religion in a party’s ideology that is the leading factor in determining that party’s attitude 
towards family and gender issues. In other words, exclusionary populist parties that are not 
explicitly religious can display a more liberal attitude towards in-group members, presenting 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. The nativist understanding of the people – as an 
ethnocultural closed group positioned against the threat of ‘others’ – signifies, primarily, that 
LGBT+ individuals can be respected and regarded as group members. Second, in-group 
tolerance is presented as a virtue that separates them from the intolerant ‘others’. And third, 
issues of family values and gender equality can be perceived as secondary to combatting the 
threats of ‘outsiders/others’.  
The two Israeli populist parties share some commonalities but differ in their approaches 
to family and gender issues. Overall, family issues are central to Israeli populism, since blood 
ties define belonging to the people (Jewishness based on matrilineal descent). However, it is 
the degree of religiosity rather than the broader national context that explains how populist 
parties address questions of gender equality, abortion and LGBT+ rights. Shas, a steeply 
religious party, displays the expected conservative position: strong opposition to LGBT+ rights 
and reluctance to accept ideas and demands for gender equality. Conversely, Likud, a party 
with a broader base of support that includes many traditional rather than religious Jews, 
displays a more liberal attitude towards issues of family values and gender equality. This 
somewhat liberal approach, however, is limited to in-group members and is matched by 
growing intolerance towards Arab citizens and asylum seekers. In the case of Likud and Shas, 
therefore, exclusionary populism can draw different boundaries between us and them, either 
conservative and based on religion, or broader and simultaneously liberal (towards the in-
group) and illiberal. 
As in Israel, the two Italian parties this paper discussed are both similar and dissimilar. 
It is clear that family and gender issues are not incidental but are at the core of messages in the 
discourses of the right-wing populist parties. For FdI, this is congruent with its neo-fascist 
roots, focused, as its main tenets, on the defence of the national community and the ‘traditional’ 
family. A somewhat distinct ideological path appeared for the Lega as well as a deep resonance 
between conservative positions on gender and family-related issues and the party’s traditional 
patriarchal and machista culture. The connection between these positions and religious values 
was often made explicit in both cases. The Lega’s current leader, Salvini, appears intent on 
striking a balance between a pro-religious orientation, which has recently acquired a peculiar 
and devotional tone, and a partial downplaying of morality issues in favour of a main focus on 
immigration and ‘Chauvinist’ welfare. In this context, immigrants are the main targets of 
stigmatisation and of the boundaries drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Under these 
circumstances, LGBT+ people are sometimes presented as the promoters of an alleged ‘gender 
conspiracy’, which is lowering Italy’s birth rate and decimating the ‘traditional’ family. But in 
other cases – in what largely appears to be a strategic if not utterly opportunistic discourse – 
they are cautiously portrayed as rights holders, especially when the stigmatisation of Islam and 
its alleged backwardness and intolerance are at stake. On the other hand, FdI – although sharing 
most of the Lega’s platform, grounds its positions on its more traditional conservative Christian 
roots, and has sometimes displayed more outspoken positions, for example in its opposition to 
abortion. In this case, the openings on family- and gender-related issues are mostly related to 
the party’s female leader Meloni who – like Marine Le Pen in France’s Rassemblement 
National party – proposed a model of engaged woman which is partly unconventional for 
conservative right culture. 
Finally, the AKP in Turkey is a religious party in a Muslim-majority country whose 
perceptions towards gender equality and family values are compatible with Mudde and 
Kaltwasser’s claims. Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s approaches to gender and family-related issues 
combine a populist, nativist understating of the people with a religious conservative mind-set. 
The AKP’s exclusionary populism, which aims to biologise the ‘Turks’, stresses the roles of 
shared blood, cultural patterns and history that sets the Turks apart from others. As a religious 
party, seeking to push back Turkey’s secularisation, however, the AKP also displays particular 
conservative attitudes towards questions of gender equality and LGBT+ rights. The traditional 
family and traditional gender roles are central to the party’s platform. The AKP government, 
growing more authoritarian, made social transformation a goal, adopting religion and a male-
dominated language and policy as a base for social cohesion. Somewhat like that of Shas, this 
exclusivist populism depicts the secular elites, previously in power, as the ‘other’ against the 
people, devout Muslims committed to religious values. 
Our comparative study of three cases and five parties, challenges Mudde and 
Kaltwasser’s claim that family and gender issues are marginal for populist parties and that these 
parties’ approaches to gender relies on the characteristics of specific national culture. First, the 
conception of the people as a traditional family is central to the nativist definition of the people 
and to the constitution of the boundaries separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. Exclusionary populism 
‘biologises’ the people, stressing the role of ‘shared blood’ as what defines the unified people. 
A relationship exists between the idea that the ‘flow of blood’ regulates rights and the 
conception of the family as a gender hierarchy (Collins 1998). The traditional family is the 
more elemental unification of the people, understood as the sameness of blood. Moreover, a 
certain degree of tolerance is instrumental to the exclusion of the Muslim ‘other’, as is the case 
for Lega and Likud, using (in-group) liberalism to demarcate boundaries. 
 Secondly, as the three cases demonstrate – but this is most salient for the AKP in 
Turkey and Shas in Israel – it is the articulation of populism with religion more than the specific 
national culture that explains the adoption of conservative family values as well as male-
chauvinist and anti-LGTB+ attitudes and policies. In our view, the analysed cases show that 
RPPs approach to family and gender stems from the combination of nativism and religion. 
When the role of religion is more vague, parties can adopt relatively open positions on family 
and gender issues, especially when a comparison with other cultures, regarded as backward, is 
at stake. Parties whose ideology is imbued with religious values stick more closely, in their 
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